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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant and Respondent, Pines Ranch, Inc., referred 
to hereafter as defendant, has been sued herein by the Appellants 
hereafter called plaintiffs, in a declaratory judgment action 
wherein plaintiffs allege that they are the owners of a 40-acre 
tract of land located in Section 34, Township 1 North, Range 7 
East, Summit County, Utah, which is surrounded by property owned 
by the defendant. They allege that a "road" to plaintiffs1 
property does now exist and has for many years existed across 
the defendant's land, and that it has been used for "logging 
and general access" to plaintiffs1 property. (The Complaint 
does not state who allegedly used this "road" nor the extent 
of such alleged use nor the location thereof.) Plaintiffs seek 
a declaratory judgment that they have a prescriptive easement to 
use this "road" and seek a restraining order preventing defendant 
from interferring with such use. No order to show cause or other 
preliminary proceedings were had seeking a temporary restraining 
order or preliminary injunction. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A motion for summary judgment made by the plaintiffs 
was argued (with supporting and opposing affidavits and memo-
randa) to the Hon. James S. Sawaya, and the motion was denied. 
Thereafter the matter came on for trial before the Hon. Stewart 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
M. Hanson, Sr., hearing the matter in Salt Lake City, beginning 
at 1:30 P.M. on January 6, 1976, pursuant to request of Court 
and stipulation of counsel, due in part to inclement weather. 
(T-2). At the conclusion of plaintiffs1 evidence, defendant 
moved to dismiss, and the Court took the motion under advise-
ment. At the conclusion of the trial, the Court (after all the 
evidence was in and the case had been argued and submitted by 
all parties) granted said motion. (R-31, 34-37). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The ruling of the trial court was proper; the plain-
tiffs failed to meet their burden of proof to establish an 
easement by prescription. The judgment below should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiffs' State of Fact is selective and in at 
least four instances is totally misleading, which will be pointed 
out initially. Additional relevant facts not mentioned in the 
plaintiffs1 Brief are then set forth in this Statement of Facts 
and to some extent in the Argument hereafter. 
Plaintiffs, in the second paragraph of their Statement 
of Fact (their Brief, page 2) in its final sentence, say: "The 
property was deeded subject to any easement or right of way of 
the public, even at that time." presumably suggesting thereby 
that there was an existing easement to plaintiffs' property. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Although Exhibit 9-P is the deed through which plaintiffs claim, 
and although it does contain the statement that said conveyance 
is "subject to any easement or right of way of the public, to 
use all such highways as may have been established" across said 
tract, such language is totally irrelevant and immaterial to 
this lawsuit because: 
1. The deed does not purport to declare that there 
is any right of way in fact. It says "as may have been estab-
lished", (Emphasis added.) 
2. It deals only with rights of way to which said 
tract is subject. (It does not deal with rights of way bene-
fitting said tract.) 
3. It deals only with the rights of the public. 
Although the facts of this case fail to show any such public 
right of way, even if there were such, that could not be the 
basis of support to a claimed private right of way. In the 
case of. Chournos v. Alkema, 27 Ut 2d 244, 494 P 2d 950 (1972) , 
the Supreme Court of Utah held: 
"One cannot claim a right of way as a private one 
by showing that it has been used by the public; he 
must show user by himself or his predecessors of 
the way to his own lot." 
At page 3 of their Brief, plaintiffs claim that the 
plaintiff, George Q. Nielsen, used the property for "logging". 
Plaintiffs1 counsel cites no reference to the record to sub-
stantiate the claim, and indeed there is no evidence to that 
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effect unless removal of a Christmas tree constitutes logging, 
as the most that can be said from the record is that Mr. Nielsen 
occasionally cut a tree/ usually at Christmas time, and presumably 
(with the exception that hereafter appears) upon his own property. 
In the final paragraph of plaintiffs1 Statement of 
Fact, it is averred that "Shortly before this lawsuit was filed, 
the defendant began interferring with plaintiffs1 access to the 
property, and the plaintiffs filed this action for declaratory 
judgment." Again no reference to the transcript is made to 
substantiate that assertion and it is misleading if intended to 
imply that defendant acquiesced or failed to object to trespass 
of defendants prior thereto. All the evidence shows that a fence 
along the western boundary of Section 34 had been in existence 
at least since 1940 (T-85) and that after—not before—the law-
suit was filed (specifically on October 4, 1975) the barbed wire 
gate in the existing fence was replaced with a chain and padlock 
by Mr. Matheson, who was a co-owner of four lots (No. 32, 33, 34 
and 35) abutting said fence and gate to the west of Section 34 
(which lots were located in the Pine Mountain Subdivision and 
were acquired by him and his partners in June 1971.) (T-66-69)• 
The boundary was thus protected by fence and gate since 1940 or 
before (T-85), and the objections of defendant to trespassing 
by plaintiffs and others has been incontrovertibly of long standing. 
(T-113, 94), and it is not something that occurred just before 
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this lawsuit was commenced. 
4. Plaintiffs state at page 3 of their Brief as 
fact: "In 19 38, Virgil Smith, a resident of Summit County, 
used the property for logging and used an established roadway 
across the Curt Wilde property to remove the logs." That is 
plaintiffs1 "left-handed" way of trying to get before the Court 
a statement that was not presented in evidence before Judge 
Hanson, specifically an affidavit of one Virgil Smith, which 
was used in connection with plaintiffs1 motion for summary judg-
ment, but which was not verified or introduced or offered by 
counsel at the trial. No opportunity, of course, was afforded 
the defendant and its counsel to cross-examine Mr. Smith or to 
determine when or where or how (or even if) he logged and across 
what property, if any, he traversed in taking out his timber. 
In any event his connection, if any, to the owner of the property 
remains a mystery, and his activity, if any, cannot help them. 
In that connection, plaintiffs did move the admission 
of an affidavit of Ethel Gibbons, and the Court erroneously and 
over the objection of defendant did admit it. (T-64). Plaintiffs 
had adduced from Mrs. Gibbons1 nephew, one Robert E. Walsh, (who 
was a witness) that Mrs. Gibbons is an elderly person and has 
periods of lucidity and others of incoherence. No effort was 
made by plaintiffs to establish Mr. Walsh as an expert on mental 
conditions, and no effort was made to ascertain or prove her state 
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of mind or provide foundation as to her lucidity as of July 5, 
1974, when the said affidavit was purported to have been executed. 
Apparently, the Court below gave said affidavit no credence. 
(Otherwise, admission of said affidavit would constitute pre-
judicial error.) In terms of supporting plaintiffs1 position, 
it contains but one statement, and that is: "During my lifetime, 
my family and I have had occasion to utilize the roadway into 
the Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 34, 
for purposes of taking out timber, grazing sheep, picnicking 
and other purposes." (R-ll). She then continued, "The roadway 
that we commonly called Shinglemill Canyon Road was the only 
means of getting to the property described above. Other people 
used it besides me and my family, and I have specific recollection 
of having used it personally in excess of Forty (40) years." 
Nothing in the affidavit indicates when the purported 40 years 
began or ended, nor whether it was continuous and uninterrupted, 
nor in what capacity she used it. 
The testimony of Mr. Walsh, Ethel Gibbons1 nephew, was 
that he, in company with his uncle (Mrs. Gibbons' husband) went 
annually to the said area to cut a Christmas tree each year 
until 1952, and from that time on has not been on it. (He wasn't 
actually sure he went to the property in question, however.) 
(T-54). It is further important to note that plaintiff, Nielsen, 
got a deed to the subject property in 1966. He testified that 
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there was a contract of purchase of the property in existence 
as early as 1962.(T-8, 9). So there is a dearth of evidence, 
testimony or otherwise, with the exception of the nebulous 
"40" years referred to in Ethel Gibbons1 inadmissible affidavit 
showing any use by the plaintiffs or their predecessors in 
interest of the purported easement or right of way prior to 
1962. There has not been a 20-year period elapse since 1962 
to the present, but in any case the activity of plaintiffs 
relating to this property has only been sporadic at best since 
1962. 
The defendant's witnesses, Mr. Stevens, Mr. Lund and 
Mr. Rogerson, all testified that the "road" running easterly 
from the gate in the boundary fence was there principally for 
the purpose of servicing an irrigation canal for the downstream 
water-rights owners (who were principally the Stevens family 
and Mr. Wilde and their predecessors). (T-25, 77, 85). In 
addition, Mr. Rogerson testified that on one occasion, the 
predecessor in ownership of 2 00 acres of the Pines Ranch, one 
Curtis Wilde, (who sold those acres to Pines Ranch in 1957) 
(T-83) asked permission of the defendant to take timber off the 
land one time in the year that he sold it. In doing so, he 
actually cut the "road" as such to a loading dock he built where 
he brought the logs and loaded them on to conveyances. (T-84, 85). 
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Mr. Rogerson was specifically asked, "Did the 'road1 run to 
the Ethel Gibbons property?" His response was, "It did not." 
(T-84,85). He later said the "road" ends at the loading dock 
and that is approximately 150 to 200 yeards from the plaintiffs1 
property. (T-89). Mr. Lund testified that the "road" turns into 
a "horse-trail" well before reaching plaintiffs1 property. (T-80). 
Mr. Stevens described the "road" as a "horse-trail". (T-25). Mr. 
Scott Matheson testified that the way was not honestly a road. 
(T-73). One of the plaintiffs, Ronald Harrington, testified he 
had used the "road" twice, both times occurring in 1975, and that 
the "road" narrows to a "path". (T-47). 
In short, all of the competent witnesses acknowledge 
that what was a road to service a canal and in one instance to 
provide access to load some logs cut by a predecessor of the 
defendant (not of plaintiffs) is being claimed now by the plaintiffs 
as a right of way to their property for general access, on the 
strength of two crossings on foot by plaintiff, Harrington, and 
the sporadic cutting of Christmas trees and hauling the same across 
said way by the plaintiff, Nielsen. 
The evidence further showed that in order to get to the 
gate in the said fence, one would have to cross the land formerly 
owned by the Stevens family, but subdivided in 1965 as Pine 
Mountain Estates. (T-27). In that connection, Mr. Stevens testi-
fied that if people (other than the Stevens) used that route, 
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they would have been trespassing. (T-31). He also said that 
only lot-owners and subdivision developers have keys issued to 
them, and that Mr. Stevens had given no key at any time to the 
plaintiff, George Q. Nielsen. (T-34). He testified finally that 
prior to the subdivision when the property vas owned by his family 
(then doing business ad the Brooklawn Creamery) that there was 
a gate on the Shingle Mill Road, which vas locked most of the time. 
(T-38). The following questions and answers were then elicited 
at page 38 of the transcript: 
"Q. This gate now has a "No Trespass" sign on it, has 
it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you remember whether there was a similar "No 
Trespass" sign on the gate before the subdivision? 
A. I donft recall. 
Q. But the Shingle Mill Road has never, during the 
period of your ownership, has never been open to the 
public for people to needlessly go in and out, is that 
correct? 
A. No, not in the twenty-five years that we have 
owned it." 
Mr. Harrington testified that on several occasions 
between 1971 and 1975, he went into plaintiffs' property. He 
testified that he went on foot from the Weber Canyon Road except 
on one occasion he was let in the Pine Mountain Estates gate by 
someone who was there at the time he arrived and drove his car to 
the boundary fence separating Pine Mountain Estates from Pines Ranch. 
(T-44, 
-9-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
49). As noted above, in October of 1975, Mr. Matheson put in a 
padlock and chain on the fence separating Section 34 from the 
Pine Mountain Estates lots and delivered keys to Pines Ranch and 
to the Stevens. (T-68,69). He was expressly asked it he gave 
any permission to any of the plaintiffs or copies or sets of 
keys to any of them to which he replied universally in the 
negative. (T-69). 
Finally, in the Statement of Facts, counsel wishes to 
call to the Court's attention the fact that just as Mr. Stevens 
testified that a "No Trespassing" sign appeared out at the Weber 
Canyon Highway bordering Section 33, so did Mr. Rogerson testify 
that at the main entrance to Pines Ranch at the north edge of 
Section 34, which faces the Weber Canyon Highway, a similar 
"No Trespassing" sign exists and has been in place for more than 
20 years. Mr. Rogerson further testified that admittedly there 
is not a "No Trespassing" sign at the gate or along the fence 
separating Section 34, the Pines Ranch property, from the Pine 
Mountain Estates property (Section 33) because "we expected 
no one else to use the property except the Stevens people and 
ourselves." (T-92,93). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE USE CLAIMED 
BY PLAINTIFFS WAS SPORADIC ONLY AND INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW 
SUCH REGULAR, OPEN, NOTORIOUS, CONTINUOUS AND ADVERSE 
USE AS TO ESTABLISH AN EASEMENT BY PRESCRIPTION. 
Plaintiffs brought this action as a declaratory judg-
ment action (R-l) seeking to have the court declare that they 
are entitled to a right of way across the defendant's property, 
which they claim to have acquired by "20 years prescriptive use." 
(T-4). 
As to the proper rule of appellate review, we refer 
the court to the case of London Guarantee and Accident Co. vs. 
Frazee, a£ 112 Ut 91, 185 P 2d 284 (1947), which involved an action 
for a declaratory judgment, and in that case, the Supreme Court 
of Utah held at page 96 that the rule of appellant review was 
as follows: 
"Our duty is to affirm the judgment of the trial 
court if, after a search of the record, we conclude 
there is substantial, competent evidence to sustain 
its findings. Even though we might have come to a 
different decision had we originally heard the action, 
we cannot now substitute our judgment for that of 
the trial court." 
In support of this, we cite the cases of Jensen v.Gerrard. 85 
Ut 481, 39 P 2d 1070 (1935) and Norback vs. Board of Directors, 
84 Ut 506, 37 P 2d 339 (1934), which are cases involving pre-
scriptive easements and in which the court held that prescriptive 
easement cases were in law. See, however, Richins v. Struhs, 
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17 Ut 2d 356, 412 P 2d 314 (1966). where the court proceeds in 
equity. It is, however, respectfully submitted that even under 
equitable principles of review the same result is inevitable 
in this case. 
The plaintiffs, throughout their Brief, frequently 
and freely assert that the plaintiffs established their prescrip-
tive easement by clear and undisputed testimony. We submit that 
a careful search of the record reveals that the plaintiffs' 
contentions are not only disputed by credible, competent, sub-
stantial evidence, but that plaintiffs1 own testimony, even if 
considered by itself, is anything but convincing or clear. We 
have canvassed the record carefully and submit that the following 
is a fair summary of all of the evidence which conceivably bears 
upon the use of the property in question by plaintiffs and their 
predecessors or privies and upon the question of ingress and 
egress by such persons across the property of the defendant: 
1. Plaintiff, George Q. Nielsen, testified that he 
went on the property (with the person from whom he later purchased 
it) in 1961, which was one year before he purchased the same. 
(T.-10) . 
2. George Q. Nielsen testified that he had the 
property surveyed in 1962 at the time he acquired it. (T-12). 
3. George Q. Nielsen testified, when asked what uses 
he had put the property to, as follows: "Well, we rode horses up 
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in there we have hired on many occasions. We have cut timber. 
We have taken out trees, and we have cut Christmas trees every 
year." (T-12). With reference to this statement, Nielsen is 
not asked, nor does he state, how many times he used it nor what 
route of ingress or egress, nor the means of transportation 
(except that one could perhaps infer that he went by horseback 
at times.) Nielsen does testify that he used the gate at the 
northwest of the property belonging to the Pines (entering 
through the Stevens property to get there. (T-17). With reference 
to said supposed "road", Nielsen states as follows at page 13 of 
the transcript: 
"Q. Would you please for the Court describe the 
nature of the roadway, and I am looking at 1962 
when you purchased the property. Describe the ' 
nature of the roadway from the time you crossed 
the Smith and Moorehouse stream until you got as 
close to your property as you could on the roadway. 
Tell us at the start of it. 
A. It was a regular canyon-type of rough dirt, 
graveled road that ran up that, ran up Shingle Mill, 
was clearly defined, and then it is true it never, 
going to my property was clearly defined but as 
you got to the edge of the Pines Ranch you could 3 
clearly see trails for a car and we have driven a 
car when we have— Well, the fire department used, 
and we have driven a quarter-ton truck to get into 
it. The terrain became more of a trail and you could 
see that they hauled timber out of there and driven 
wagons out of there, and I could get to my property 
at any time with a four-wheel drive and with clearing 
a little foliage I could drive a car." 
If Nielsen drove his "four-wheel drive" vehicle into the property 
more than once, he is careful not to say so. 
-1 3-
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4. George Q. Nielsen testified that he went hunting 
in the area in 19 56 and 1957, which was five years before he 
acquired the property. There is no testimony, however, that 
such vists were in any way authorized by the then owner. (T-19). 
5. Defendant, Ronald Harrington, testified that he 
had been on the property several times between 1971 and 1975. 
He testified that the first time he went in from the Pines north 
gate and that in May or June 1975 he came in over the Stevens 
property through the gate at the northwest corner twice. (T-42, 43). 
6. Robert C. Walsh testified that he had been to the 
area about one time each year from 19 36 to 19 52 to get Christmas 
trees. Walsh testified that hp was a nephew of a former owner, 
but he admitted that he did not actually know the location of 
of the property, but assumed that they were on the proper tract 
in obtaining the Christmas trees. (T-54). 
7. Walsh also testified that he had been hunting in 
the area, but did not know whether he was on the property in 
question or not, nor did he testify that he was there by authority 
of the then owners. (T-54). 
8. William Ray Hauter testified that he was a lieu-
tenant in the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department and co-worker 
of plaintiff, George Q. Nielsen. He testified that he went upon 
the property in question 6 or 7 times with Nielsen to obtain 
Christmas trees and to hunt grouse and testified that these visits 
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commenced approximately seven years ago. He testified that they 
had gone by car as far as the gate at the northwest fenceline, but 
not by car beyond (T-59, 61) . In response to the question as to 
how far from the fence an automobile could be driven (going 
east) he said at page 61 of the transcript: 
A. Well, this would be difficult. There was an 
old roadway there. It appeared to be a roadway. 
It hadn't been used probably for vehicular traffic 
for sometime, but it was a road. Probably could 
have driven a short distance on that, yes. 
This seems to contradict Nielsen's testimony about going to the 
property by motor vehicle or at least tends to show such an event 
to have been isolated and remote. 
9. The Court, over the objection of the defendant, 
admitted the affidavit of Ethel Gibbons. (T-64). Testimony in 
this form is clearly inadmissible and would be prejudicial and 
reversible error if indeed the Court had relied upon same. (If 
Mrs. Gibbons was unable to come to court, her testimony should 
have been secured by deposition, assuming competency. As it is, 
defendants never were given an opportunity to cross-examine and 
there is no showing of her mental capacity at the time she made 
the affidavit in any event.) Actually the affidavit does not 
materially assist the plaintiffs. The trial court apparently 
concurred with this view. The affidavit, so far as the issues 
of this lawsuit are concerned, says that Ethel Gibbons and her 
family used the roadway into the property for purposes of taking 
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out timber, grazing sheep, picnicking and other purposes. It 
further states that Ethel Gibbons personally used what she 
termed "Shinglemill Canyon Road" for in excess of 40 years. 
(see paragraphs 2 and 3 of the affidavit.) She does not, how-
ever, state in her affidavit what roadway she is referring to 
in paragraph 2, and although she does refer to the name of a 
roadway in paragraph 3 as being "Shinglemill Canyon Road", 
there is no way of determining what Ethel Gibbons understood 
to be the "Shinglemill Canyon Road" is it relates to a supposed 
prescriptive easement across the Pines Ranch. There is no way 
of determining what, in her mind, the situs of the road would 
be. Furthermore, although she states that she personally used 
this road for in excess of 40 years, we are not told what 40 
years is meant, and we are not told when any such use began or 
ended and we are not told if it was continuous and uninterrupted, 
nor whether it was regular, open or notorious. In fact, her 
entire affidavit is consistent with sporadic (and even permissive) 
use in any event. 
10. Milton Kenneth Rogerson, who was a part-owner of 
the Pines and a member of the Board of Directors, testified that 
he has been acquainted with the property in question since 192 8 
and has been a part-owner of the defendant since 1940. (T-81) 
When asked regarding use prior to the mid-19 60's, he stated, 
"Nobody used it without our permission." (T-113). He further 
stated at page 113 of the transcript: 
_ 1 C — 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Q. Nobody objected? 
A. Yes, we objected. 
Q. How did you object? 
A. We objected because it was ours. 
Q. How did you object? 
A. There was no traffic on it. 
MR. MADSEN: Let him answer, Counsel. 
A. There was no purpose for anybody to go on our 
property. For whatever they used it for they would 
have to have used our property. That is the reason 
we objected. 
Q. How did you object? Did you write letters, go 
on the ground, kick them off? 
A. We kicked them off if we saw them. 
11. The said Rogerson also testified that the Gibbons 
family had used the Gibbons property for sheep at some time in 
the past, but that the sheep had been brought in from the south 
and had left by the northwest gate, but that had not occurred 
since about 19 50 or 1951. Furthermore, this reference to the 
Gibbons family was not to Ethel Gibbons and her husband as such, 
but rather to the Gibbons family as a whole. It was the Gibbons 
family in the larger sense that was referred to by Rogerson and 
he stated that Albert, who was representative for the Gibbons 
family, admitted to Rogerson that he had no right of way. (T-10 5). 
There was also testimony that the Gibbons family had used what 
is referred to as the "Wilde Road", which was at a different 
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location to the alleged road in question in this lawsuit. It 
should be noted that even in connection with the testimony con-
cerning the ingress and egress of sheep, there is no testimony 
as to how often it was used and no basis upon which to establish 
a prescriptive easement by that activitiy, which has long since 
been abandoned in any event. 
12. The aforesaid Rogerson also testified that in 
approximately 1965 he met the plaintiff, George Q. Nielsen, on 
the premises and told him that he was trespassing. Plaintiff, 
Nielsen, in his testimony admitted the encounter, but denied 
portions of Rogerson's testimony in that regard. (T-9 3, 94, 116, 
and 122). 
13. The said Rogerson testified that the Gibbons family 
was a permissive user through the north gate on occasion. (T-104). 
14. Rogerson further testified with reference to the 
northwest gate of the Pines property, that owners to the west 
had used it to cross the Pines Ranch for purposes of keeping the 
canal to their premises cleared each year. As to its creation as 
a road, he testified that this was accomplished in 1956 by Mr. 
Wilde (T-83, 84), at which time Wilde obtained permission from 
the Pines to remove timber through their property and he cut 
the road for that purpose. The remains of that road are appar-
ently visible in the photographs admitted in evidence, but 
Rogerson testified that the so-called road as shown in the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
photographs ended 150 to 200 yards from the plaintiffs' 
property in any event. (T-89). He also testified that beyond 
that point it wg.s at most a game trail. He used the phrase 
"indications of animal traffic," (T-85, 89). Nielsen even 
characterized the supposed road as a "trail". (T-13). Harrington 
ca^ls it a "path". (T-47) Walsh refers to a "trail", (T-55) but 
isn't even sure of the location of the Gibbons property with 
reference thereto. Scott M. Matheson, owner of the lots just 
west of the gate, testified that even at its beginning, the so-
called road does not appear to be a road, but rather just a few 
tire tracks. (T-73). Herman Lund, a part-owner of the Pines 
and the predecessor in interest of Matheson in the lots just to 
the west of the said gate, refers to the so-called road as a 
"horse-trail",. (T-80) as does Stevens. (T-25) . 
The prerequisites in Utah to the establishment of a 
prescriptive easement are clearly set forth in the case of Jensen 
v. Gerrard, supra, in the following language found at page 487: 
"Before a right of way can be acquired by prescription, 
the use for the prescriptive period must be peaceable, 
continuous, open, adverse as of right, and with the 
knowledge and acquiescence of the plaintiff and his 
grantors and predecessors in interest. Actual notice 
to the owner of the servient estate is not necessary 
if the user is so notorious that in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence the owner should learn thereof; 
then he will have constructive notice of the user 
which is sufficient." 
In the light of these prinqiples, it is abundantly 
clear that the plaintiffs totally failed in their testimony to 
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establish a prescriptive easement for at least the following 
reasons: > . 
, 1. The testimony totally fails to show a continuous, 
uninterrupted use for a period of 20 years. If the affidavit of 
Ethel Gibbons is excluded, as it should be, all that remains is 
an occasional use by George Q. Nielsen, Ronald Harrington and 
William Ray Hauter since 19 62, which at best is a period of 14 
years. The testimony of Walsh's limited use likewise does not 
meet the 20-year requirement as it commenced in 1936 and ended 
in 1952, a period of 16 years. The Walsh period and the Nielsen 
period are interrupted by ten years of non-use from 1952 to 1962. 
Even if Ethel Gibbons1 testimony were admissible, it does not 
improve the situation because the period of her use is not 
identified in terms of time of beginning or ending, nor does 
her testimony establish that her use was continuous or regular, 
uninterrupted, open or notorious, or peaceable, or that defendant 
knew, or should have known, of such use. It also fails to identify 
the location or route used and how often such route or routes 
were used. 
2. In addition to failing to show 20 years continuous/ 
uninterrupted use, the use testified to is only incidental and 
sporadic in nature and is not such as to establish a prescriptive 
easement in any event. A review of the testimony of Nielsen, 
Harrington and Hauter does not show the kind of use which is 
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necessary to establish a prescriptive easement. This use of 
the property is occasional and temporary, and they do not show 
any consistent activity unless it could be the removal of a 
Christmas tree each year. Even this activity takes place in 
the winter when the occupants of the Pines Ranch are hampered 
by snow from acquiring knowledge of the activities of Nielsen 
and certainly cannot be said to have been aware thereof, except 
for the one in3tance in which Rogerson happened to find Nielsen 
on the property and told him that he was trespassing. The 
activity of Walsh is likewise of a sporadic nature only and 
amounts to going on to the property one time per year to remove 
a Christmas tree, and this we submit is not sufficient activity 
to establish a prescriptive easement. Even Ethel Gibbons1 
affidavit does not establish the kind of activity which would 
be required to establish a prescriptive easement because it 
does not indicate that the actitities that she sets out in her 
affidavit were other than incidental and temporary in nature. 
3. Finally, it should be observed that even if the 
usage testified to by the plaintiffs was sufficient to make a 
prima facie case, it is directly contradicted by the testimony 
of Milton Kenneth Rogerson. He testified that any use prior to 
the mid-1960's was permissive and he stated that if they found 
people on the property withoi^ t permission they told them to 
leave. This, of course, creates a situation in any event of 
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conflicting testimony and under general rules of appellate 
review, the decision of the trial court in this regard will 
not be overturned. 
The general rule is well established that in order to 
obtain a prescriptive easement, the use must be continuous and 
uninterrupted, and this means it must have substance and signifi-
cance. Whereas it is true that "what shall constitute such conti-
nuity can be stated only with reference to the nature and character 
of the right claimed", it is nevertheless equally clear that a 
prescriptive easement cannot be acquired by "occasional and 
sporadic acts for temporary purposes". The foregoing language 
is taken from 25 Am Jur 2d, Easements, §56. The reason for this, 
at least in part, is that the use must have sufficient substance 
and magnitude that the owner of the fee can reasonably be charged 
with knowledge thereof. A prescriptive easement cannot be obtained 
by stealth. In Zollinger v. Frank, 110 Ut 514, 175 P 2d 714 (1947) 
the court at page 522 states that it is important to know "whether 
the servient estate owner knew of should have known during the 
entire prescriptive period that the claimant was using the claimed 
right of way." (Emphasis added.) 
In their Brief, plaintiffs cite the case of Cooper v. 
Carter Oil Co., 7 Ut 2d 9, 316 P 2d 320 (1957) in which the Supreme 
Court of Utah found adverse possession under circumstances which 
consisted of grazing sheep upon the land in question for three 
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weeks out of the year. We do not think that that case supports 
the plaintiffs' position at all. First of all, it does not deal 
with a prescriptive easement, and furthermore, under the circum-
stanqes of the case, the evidence disclosed that the land was 
grazing land and that the grazing thereon was only good for three 
weeks per year and, therefore, although the use was only three 
weeks per year, it did, in fact, constitute 100% use of the 
property, In the instant case, we do not even have a use of 
the property approaching three weeks per year. Little more has 
been done with the property than to occasionally remove a tree 
at Christmas time. That amounts to a use of about one day per 
year at most, in the wintertime when no one much is about and, 
furthermore, there are not eveji ?Q continuous years of removing 
the Christmas trees. 
Further , the plaintiffs have subdivided the property 
in question into 8 five-acre tracts for summer home use, and there 
is no evidence whatsoever in this record that anyone ever slept 
as much as one night on tjieir property. Plaintiffs seek to 
establish a right of way for use as a summer home subdivision, 
but totally ignore the lack of any prior use of that nature, and 
at the very least, summer home use or more exactly# lack of it, 
is a significant factor in determining what past use will be held 
to be sporadic, occasional or temporary. 
Finally, it should be noted that plaintiffs admit their 
claimed use was sporatic(Plaintiffs"brief, p.14). 
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POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN FINDING THAT IN 
RECENT YEARS THE USE MADE OF THE ALLEGED RIGHT OF WAY 
WAS ESSENTIALLY PERMISSIVE AND THAT DEFENDANT HAS MADE 
EVERY ATTEMPT IT COULD TO KEEP PEOPLE FROM TRESPASSING 
ACROSS ITS LAND. 
V In its Findings of Fact, the trial court found that in 
recent years the use made of the alleged right of way has been 
essentially permissive, and that defendant has made every attempt 
it could to keep people from trespassing across its land. (R-35). 
This finding is fully supported by the evidence and we cite par-
ticularly the following items: .;..-.-. < 
1. Since at least 1940, there has been a gate and fence 
alonq the west boundary of the Pines Ranch to control access. 
(T-85) . _^
 ; -,;,..' '. ;,.: > -;• •• - •••'!• , * ; - . ; 
JU There is a locked gate on the north boundary of 
the Pines and "No Trespassing" sign. (T-49, 50,92, 104). 
, 3 * Rogerson found plaintiff, George Q. Nielsen, on 
the premises in about 1965 and complained to him that he was tres-
passing. (T-93, 94, 122). ........ 
4. Rogerson testified that prior to the mid-1960's 
no one entered the premises without permission and if persons were 
found on the property without permission, they were "kicked off". 
(T-113). 
5. Wilde constructed the road and used it to remove 
timber during one season, all with permission of defendant. (T--83, 84) 
6. Rogerson testified that the Gibbons family were 
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permissive users through the north and that the family spokes-
man acknowledged that the Gibbons had no right of way. (T-104, 105) 
7. All of the foregoing actions must be considered 
in the light of the measures taken by the Stevens family and 
their successors on the west to prevent access to their property, 
all of which has resulted in cutting off access to the defendant's 
west boundary. But for the measures taken by the Stevens family, 
more severe measures by defendant would perhaps have been appro-
priate as defendant might reasonably have been required to antici-
pate trespassers from the west. It should be noted that the 
Stevens people: 
(a) Maintained a fence and locked gate across the 
north of their property for
 at least the last 25 years. (T-9 ). 
(b) Keys were given to those entitled to them, but 
not to plaintiffs. (T-34). 
(c) The area to the west of the Pines gate has been 
subdivided and sold to Matheson, who has put a locked chain 
across the gate. (T-66-69). 
Without arguing the matter further, it appears clear 
that the record contains more than enough evidence to support the 
aforesaid finding of the Court and, in fact, compels the finding 
as set out in Point IV above. 
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POINT III. THE COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THIS CASE 
DOES NOT FALL WITHIN RICHINS V. STRUHS. 
In its Memorandum Decision,the trial court held that 
this case does not fall within the decision of the Supreme Court 
in the case of Richins v. Struhs, supra. In this, the trial 
court was correct. The real issue in the Richins case was 
whether the use was permissive or not permissive. As we read 
it/ that case stands for the proposition that when a claimant 
has shown that his use has been open, notorious and continuous 
for more than 20 years, that the "law presumes that the use is 
adverse to the owner; and that it had a legitimate origin", 
(page 359). That case, therefore, does not do away with the 
requirement that the use be open, notorious, continuous and 
adverse for over 20 years. That; is still a condition precedent. 
In the instant case, that requirement was never met and, there-
fore, the presumption never comes into effect. Furthermore, 
the presumption is rebuttable, and under the circumstances of 
this ca$e, it is respectfully submitted that any such presump-
tion has been fully rebutted in any event. 
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DOES NOT DENY PLAINTIFFS 
ACCESS TO THEIR PROPERTY NOR RENDER IT WORTHLESS.
 :i 
In Point IV of their Brief, plaintiffs make a very 
emotional appeal that the trial court has denied them access 
to their property and rendered it worthless. That is absurd. 
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The trial court has only ruled, and properly so, that plaintiffs 
failed to prove a prescriptive easement. If plaintiffs1 property 
is worthless without a prescriptive easement, it was not the 
decision of the Court that brought it about. If such is the 
case, it was worthless before the Court ruled, as the Court 
only declared the status between the parties in a declaratory 
judgment action. It appears, however, that plaintiffs can obtain 
access to their property by eminent domain pursuant to Section 
78-34-1(7), Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended. They will, 
of course, have to pay the reasonable value thereof, and the 
right of way will have to be placed on the ground in a location 
which will do the minimum of damage to defendant. 
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In Point IV of their Brief, plaintiffs appear to com-
plain that defendant is allowing livestock to graze on plaintiffs1 
subdivision. The record does not support that as a bona fide 
complaint, but if indeed it is, there are proper means to deal 
with it, but not in an action seeking a prescriptive easement. 
Also in Point IV, plaintiffs raise the issue of what 
was paid for their property. Nielsen did not know the principal 
amount that he paid for the land (T-21) and even if it were the 
$7,000 total that he did refer to, there is no evidence that the 
resulting cost of the land of $175 per acre for the 40 acres was 
a reasonable price with right of way, but not without. For all 
the record shows, the $175 per acre price was based upon lack of 
right of way and, in fact, it may be at a level which contemplates 
an additional expenditure for a right of way. It may indeed be 
the plaintiffs who would be getting the "windfall" if the trial 
court were to be reversed. 
Plaintiffs allege in Point IV that defendant is guilty 
of taking "all they can take, giving nothing in return." That 
is a totally unfounded and irresponsible statement. If anyone 
is trying to get something for nothing in this case, it would 
appear to be the plaintiffs. They are attempting, on the basis 
of isolated, sporadic, and really inconsequential contacts with 
the property (involving mainly the removal of an occasional 
Christmas tree<—accomplished on foot or at most perhaps some-
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times by horseback) to subject defendant's property to a full-
fledged right of way for motor vehicles to service a subdivision 
of eight lots for summer home use for who knows how many people. 
This is not fair play and it is not the law.. Even if there were 
a right of way, the owner thereof cannot increase the burden on 
the servient estate, and in the event of subdivision of the domi-
nant estate, the easement does not inure to the benefit of the 
owner of a parcel which, after the division, does not abut on the 
way. The Utah cases so hold. In this case, the evidence did not 
show right of way even going to the 40-acre tract as a unit, and 
it certainly does not show that it went to each of the eight 
five-acre tracts which have been subdivided from the orgina.1. 
Undeniably, eight summer homes will constitute an increased bur-
den under any circumstances. In support of the foregoing, we 
refer the court to the following cases: Wood v., Ashley, 122 Ut 
580, 253 P 2d 351 (1952); and Nielsen v. Sandberg, 1Q5 Ut 93, 
141 P 2d 696 (1943). 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the decision of the lower 
court is fully supported by the evidence, that the decision is 
a fair and just one, and respectfully pray that the Supreme 
Court affirm the decision of the trial court. 
DATED this 5th day of August, 1976. 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
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Mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief to Richard 
Richards, attorney for plaintiffs, at his address,1 2506 Madison 
Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401, postage prepaid, this day 
of August, 1976. 
Attorney for Respondent 
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